Mensch or Shmendrik: Larry’s Concepts of Good and Evil
[excerpt from "Curb Your Enthusiasm and Philosophy"]
[This represents a BONUS for those fans of philosophy and pop culture out there. Fresh off the rave reviews (thanks, Mom!) of my work for “Red Sox and Philosophy,” I was asked to partake in the publisher’s latest endeavor—”Curb Your Enthusiasm and Philosophy.” As a fan of the show along with an eminently qualified philosopher by this time, I leaped at the chance. I don’t know where my piece resides in the book as I’ve never read it. But that shouldn’t stop you from taking three minutes out of your lives to indulge in this literate poppycock. Enjoy!]
Among the broadest of all philosophical concepts are good and evil. Larry applies his functional account of good and evil less on virtues than on the irreverence of minutiae. The good, or the right, in his mind determines the moral character of the cast around him thus categorizing them, to him, as a “mensch,” a Yiddush term meaning “a person of integrity and honor,” or a “shmendrik,” “someone who is totally lacking in social graces, a contemptible person.” Our goal is to conclude what criteria Larry uses for such a determination.
Moral goodness has been described on one level as performing your various social roles well or possessing these qualities that a friend or fellow citizen would want in you. In Larry’s world, he usually performs the roles wonderfully since he, himself, invents the morality – with virtues such as “thou shalt not take from another’s fridge without permission,” “if given a gift certificate to a restaurant, it is polite for the givee to invite the giver along,” or “instead of recommending that someone get a sponge, you should, in fact, get the sponge” – by which all shall be judged.
Two schools of thought inform this philosophy – one is that actions issue directly from character identifying moral goodness with the possession of certain traits. Conversely, others claim the concept of free will allows one to act regardless of inherent traits. He or she is responsible for his or her actions.
In Larry’s world, he chooses to believe the latter. And thus, a shmendrik has complete control over his actions and should respond closer to Larry’s standards of behavior.
But what of Kant’s further expansion of this study between free will and predispositions? The philosopher describes a form of moral goodness different from virtue or goodness of character traits, namely goodness of the will or moral worth. This pertained to the well-functioning of the will itself, either as it is exercised in particular actions or as a regular disposition.
Larry seems to cling to this definition of moral worth as Kant claims that you may achieve moral worth even if you have temperamental qualities which make it hard for you to do what duty demands. More specifically, Larry may achieve moral worth.
Conveniently, he has qualities of this nature. He refuses to move up to the front seat when another passenger exits a car; if his wife comes home from a trip while the game on television is nearing its conclusion, he should be allowed to finish watching before giving his full attention to her; he doesn’t believe he should have to take his shoes off in another’s home because his feet get chilly; he is able to tell a secret even though he’s promised that he wouldn’t; etc.
None of these transgressions make him a shmendrik, however. As an explanation why, we focus on the definition of evil, typically the most severe condemnation our moral vocabulary allows, but immensely undervalued here, maintaining a status slightly above “mildly irritating.” Traditionally, it is the violation of moral and ethical standards put forth by a society, religion, philosophy, etc. In Larry’s case, the purveyor of ethics and morals is Larry. Others may have different standards than those Larry adheres to, but that only serves to indict them. They should follow his rules of ethics.
But still, even with rules in place, they are not hard and fast. Larry’s criteria are loose. The line between good and evil fluctuates with Larry’s desires. For example, it is wrong to go into someone else’s fridge to retrieve a beverage without asking permission . . . unless Larry is the one doing it, in which case, it’s acceptable.
In this sense, Larry seems to agree wholly with Spinoza’s explanation of good and evil; mainly that the difference between good and evil is one of personal inclinations.